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Abstract: The 2000s witnessed the third poverty alleviation wave of China. 
Compared with its predecessors, the third wave distinguished itself by new 
interventions and redefined standards for the National Poor Counties. This paper 
evaluates the effectiveness of the new program using a data set consisting of 1,411 of 
China’s western and central counties from 2000 to 2010. We combine the propensity 
score matching method with the difference-in-differences approach, which enables us 
to avoid selection bias and track the policy impact on variables of interest at each time 
point. It is found that the non-west local governments were inclined to restrict their 
economic growth to maintain the special transfer payments disbursed exclusively to 
the National Poor Counties. It is also shown that the program failed to improve the 
infrastructure and sanitary conditions in general.  
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1. Introduction 
 
    The 2000s experienced a new wave of poverty alleviation in China. Compared 
with its two predecessors, namely the initial wave (1986–1993) of China’s poverty 
reduction and the second wave (1994–2000), which was also called the 8-7 Plan, the 
third wave was characterized by a dramatic change in the standard of poverty and the 
formulation of new policies against rural poverty. The world’s largest regional poverty 
targeting program, which resulted in marvelous economic growth in China, was 
proved to be a huge success in poverty alleviation in the developing world, leading to 
a drastic reduction in the population of the poor from about 125 million in 1986, the 
first year of China’s war against rural poverty, to around 32 million in 2000, the final 
year of the 8-7 Plan. In the third wave, the number of people living in poverty 
continued to decrease, to about 26.88 million in 2010.3 
Although the first two waves were viewed as a template in China’s war on 
poverty, there existed two main limitations behind the numerous merits. First, political 
factors had affected the selection of the National Poor Counties, which was the major 
intervention in each wave (Park et al., 2002). As time went by, the targeting program 
deteriorated, since lobbying efforts and political resistance forced the government not 
to take National Poor County status away from the initially designated counties, 
which had already passed the poverty line. Second, the distribution of the poor 
population also changed over time. At the beginning of the reform and opening-up 
policy, most of the poverty-stricken rural population mainly lived in contiguous areas. 
In 1993, the poverty-stricken population living in the National Poor Counties 
increased to about 72%, from 50% in 1986, and two-thirds of this population were 
located in the eastern and central provinces. However, the coverage of the counties 
shrank to about 60% in 2001, and the poverty level in the eastern provinces greatly 
decreased due to their soaring economic growth. In response to the newly apparent 
drawbacks of the old program, the Chinese government made two main changes in the 
                                                              
3  During  the  third wave, China  raised  the poverty  line  and  extended  the  coverage of  the population  living  in 
poverty to benefit not only the previous rural poor but also the low‐income population. The number here follows 
the new statistical criteria. 
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third wave. To avoid political obstacles, the Chinese government adopted a more 
comprehensive method when selecting new National Poor Counties, which was 
known as the “631 index” method. Furthermore, to increase the coverage of the rural 
poor population, along with county-level policies, the Chinese government began to 
consider including poor villages in the counties. It is also worth noting that since 
almost all the eastern counties shook off poverty in the first two waves, the Chinese 
government excluded all the counties in the eastern provinces from the new program 
in the third wave. This rationalizes our exclusive focus on central and western 
counties in this study. Table 1 describes the distribution of the poverty-stricken 
population in the third wave. 
This paper is closely associated with the previous literature on anti-poverty 
programs in China, not only in terms of chronological order but also the empirical 
approach. The previous two poverty reduction waves are studied separately by Park et 
al. (2002) and Meng (2013). The former analysis exploits a four-period income 
growth model, estimates the impact of poverty investments, and uses the propensity 
score matching method as a robustness check. The main finding is that the National 
Poor Counties program increased the rural income per capita by 2.28% per year in the 
first wave. Taking advantage of the policy change in 1994, the latter paper employs a 
regression discontinuity approach, which uses the propensity score as an instrumental 
variable to estimate the impact of the second wave. The author finds that the second 
wave brought about a 38% increase in rural income for the newly designated National 
Poor Counties. Though the importance of the propensity score was limited in these 
two papers, the usefulness of the newly introduced method in the non-randomness 
environment is revealed. Thus, we believe that by combining with various matching 
methods, the propensity score can play a more important role in the program 
evaluation. Moreover, the existing literature mainly focuses on the impact of a 
program on income increment but ignores other changes brought about by the policy. 
It is reasonable for us to evaluate sanitary and infrastructure conditions, since China’s 
central government for the first time explicitly included targets to improve health in 
the program, and reinforced the importance of increasing infrastructure conditions in 
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poor counties. 
    It has always been a great challenge to estimate the causal effects of a program 
when a randomized controlled trial is not attainable. However, when public 
interventions are based on manipulable variables, the causation can be found (Rubin, 
1986). The manipulation may wrongly attribute the effect caused by the pretreatment 
characteristic difference between the treated and the control cohorts to the assigned 
treatment, if the two cohorts are unbalanced. Moreover, when we attempt to track the 
time-varying impact of the program using the difference-in-differences method, the 
pre-assigned imbalance will cause a further problem. To reduce the selection bias 
resulted from the problem of imbalance, we adopt the propensity score matching 
methods to transform the quasi-experimental studies into a randomized experimental 
approach.  
Employing a panel data set consisting of 1,411 central and western Chinese 
counties over 11 years, we estimate reliable propensity scores by comparing seven 
differentiated matching methods, and evaluate the impact of the National Poor 
Counties program in China’s third poverty alleviation wave by using the 
difference-in-differences approach. Our main findings include two parts. First, we 
identify two possible mechanisms through which the program functioned. Based on 
our estimation, the program generally has no or negative effects on the whole sample. 
However, rather than boosting the economy, non-west local governments preferred to 
limit their economic growth so as to maintain the special transfer payments disbursed 
exclusively to the National Poor Counties. Second, we found that the program failed 
to influence the western and central counties as a whole and achieve its diversified 
goals, which included the improvement of infrastructure and sanitary conditions. 
However, for certain subsamples, the program was found not totally in vain. 
    The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 comprehensively 
reviews the history of China’s poverty alleviation waves, including the successes 
achieved in each wave. Section 3 validates and describes the selected variables to 
estimate the propensity score. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategies. Results are 
reported in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 offers the conclusion. 
5 
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Poverty in China 
In China, there is no doubt that poverty is mainly a rural phenomenon (World 
Bank, 2001; Meng, 2013). It seems to be an inevitable result of the long existence of 
the dual economic structure in China’s urban and rural areas. For a long time, the 
Chinese government had exclusively provided urban citizens with various social 
welfare services, to which rural residents had no access. The rigorous household 
registration system exacerbated the welfare disparity between households in the urban 
and rural areas even more. Soon after the reform and opening-up, a difference in 
incidence of rural poverty began to exist between opulent coastal and less developed 
inland areas. Since then, China’s poverty has switched from a country-wide 
phenomenon to one that concentrated in the western and central parts. Moreover, 
residents in revolutionary based areas, minority autonomous areas, and certain remote 
areas were more prone to poverty than the rest of the rural population. 
    Three waves of regional poverty alleviation programs have been identified since 
1986: the first wave was implemented from 1986 to 1993; the second wave, from 
1994 to 2000; and the third wave, from 2001 to 2010. Because of its huge success in 
poverty reduction, we include the period from 1978 to 1985 as the prior wave as well, 
even though it lacked any explicit poverty reduction policy. Figure 1 shows the 
geographic distribution of the National Poor Counties in each wave. Points shaded in 
black stand for the National Poor Counties. We can see that as time went by, the 
government spent more efforts on poverty reduction in inland areas. 
 
2.2 The prior wave (1978–1985): 
Despite the absence of explicit poverty-targeted programs and coordination at the 
central government level prior to 1986, Chinese leaders never stopped their pace of 
the fight against poverty since the reform and opening-up. Given that more than 90 
percent of the population living in poverty resided in rural areas, poverty in China was 
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mainly a rural phenomenon. According to a report by the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China4, about 250 million Chinese people, accounting for 30.7% of the total rural 
population, were identified as poor. Members of this population had an annual income 
of below 100 Yuan. Then, based on a variety of surveys, three main causes of 
widespread poverty during this wave were proved to be system-related. The rural land 
system, which restricted rural productivity due to its lack of incentives, was indicated 
as the source of rural poverty. In addition, to accumulate funds for industry, the 
Chinese market system adopted a system of unified purchase and sale, and utilized the 
scissors gap between the prices of agricultural products and industrial products, which 
aggravated rural poverty. Meanwhile, as demonstrated by the household registration 
system, the employment system constrained the flow of the surplus rural labor force, 
which also exacerbated poverty. 
Therefore, to alleviate rural poverty, system changes were needed. In order to 
enhance the incentives for peasants, the household contract responsibility system 
replaced the highly collective people’s commune system. From then on, rural 
households began to be independent in cultivating their farmlands. Meanwhile, the 
subsidized primary product sales (Park et al., 1994), which aimed to reduce the 
scissors gap between the prices of agricultural products and industrial ones, were 
announced. In 1979, the Chinese government increased the prices of ten kinds of 
agricultural products, including grain, cotton, and oil-bearing crops. From 1978 to 
1985, the total income induced by the policy was 125.74 billion Yuan, accounting for 
a 15.5% increase in rural household income. Another policy was to encourage the 
growth of township enterprises. From 1983, township enterprises began to flourish. 
Within three years, the number of township enterprises increased from about 1.34 
million in 1983 to 12.22 million in 1985, with the increase in total output value from 
101.68 billion Yuan to 272.84 billion Yuan. Respectively, the above three reforms 
enhanced land productivity, increased agricultural income for farmers, and opened 
doors for peasants to embark on non-agricultural tasks; in the meantime, the series of 
policies was implemented to boost the rural economy, relieve rural poverty, and 
                                                              
4  Data source: Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2000. 
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ameliorate the industrial structure.  
The achievement of this wave was outstanding. At the end of 1985, the 
population below the poverty line reduced from 250 million in 1978 to 125 million, 
with the poverty incidence decreased to 14.8% from 30.7%. Meanwhile, the average 
annual income increased from 134 Yuan to 397 Yuan.5 
 
2.3 The first wave (1986–1993): 
Benefiting from the nationwide economic growth drawn by the institutional 
reform in the last wave, an overwhelming majority of the rural population, who had 
suffered in poverty due to the lack of economic opportunities, shook off poverty by 
taking advantage of their superiority in geography and resources. This uneven 
development caused the rural poverty to become a regional problem, rather than a 
national phenomenon as it had been in the past 30 years. The rural poor were mainly 
distributed in the old revolutionary based regions (lao qu), minority autonomous areas 
(minzu zizhiqu), and certain inland parts, which basically connected 18 large areas. 
Geographically, the 18 areas presented an increasingly concentrated trend from the 
east to the west.  
To address the newly appeared poverty regionality, the Chinese government 
launched the largest regionally targeted anti-poverty program in the developing world. 
In 1986, the State Council set up the Leading Group for Economic Development in 
Poor Areas (Leading Group hereafter), which was a specialized inter-ministerial 
anti-poverty institution consisting of all the ministers whose duties were associated 
with poverty alleviation, to administer and coordinate the new poverty alleviation 
program. As a major targeting device, the Leading Group enacted the National Poor 
Counties policy soon after its establishment. For national and political considerations, 
the Leading Group finally adopted a mixed set of standards to identify the National 
Poor Counties. The basic poverty line for selecting the National Poor Counties was to 
have a rural net income per capita of below 150 Yuan in 1985. However, for counties 
located in old revolutionary base regions or minority autonomous areas, the poverty 
                                                              
5  Data source: Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2000. 
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line was raised to 200 Yuan. The standard was further relaxed to 300 Yuan for 
counties in very important revolutionary base regions and minority autonomous areas 
in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Qinghai.6 According to the above standards, 258 
counties were initially designated as the National Poor Counties in 1986. In the 
following two years, another 70 counties were selected as National Poor Counties as 
well. By 1988, provinces identified an additional of 370 counties as provincial poor 
counties, which were supported by the provinces themselves. Compared to the 
National Poor Counties, the provincial ones usually needed to meet more rigorous 
standards but received fewer benefits. 
The regional targeted poverty alleviation program was proved to be a huge 
success. The population living in poverty continued to decrease in this period, from 
125 million in 1986 to 80 million in 1993. Correspondingly, the poverty incidence 
dropped from 14.8% following the last wave to 8.7% at the end of 1993. Meanwhile, 
rural net income per capita in the National Poor Counties increased from 206 Yuan to 
484 Yuan.7 
 
2.4 The second wave (1994–2000):  
Although the regional targeted program in the first stage covered a sizeable 
amount of the rural poor, Park et al. (2002) claim that the heavy political compromise 
during the poor counties selection procedure undermined the program’s efficiency. 
Certain qualified counties had to give up their eligibility to those politically favored 
counties which had a rural net income higher than the poverty line (World Bank, 
2001). In addition, some researchers cast doubt on the validity of the poverty line used 
to select the National Poor Counties (Meng, 2013). In response to previous criticisms 
and the change in geographic distribution of the poor, the Chinese government 
instituted a new large-scale poverty alleviation program in 1994. Known as the 8-7 
Plan, the Chinese government promised to lift the majority of the remaining 80 
                                                              
6  In 1988, another standard was set up to include a few pastoral and semi‐pastoral counties, based on the rural 
net income data from 1984 to 1986. Pastoral counties with an average net income per capita below 300 Yuan and 
semi‐pastoral counties with an average net income per capita below 200 Yuan were identified as the new 
National Poor Counties. 
7  Data source: Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2000. 
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million rural poor from poverty by 2000 (within seven years).  
The entire program was still overseen by the Leading Group, which renewed the 
poverty line and hence the list of the National Poor Counties in 1994. The revised list 
initially included only 326 counties with a rural net income per capita of below 400 
Yuan in 1992. However, facing political pressure from the National Poor Counties 
selected in the last wave, the Chinese government raised the poverty line for those 
counties to 700 Yuan. Finally, the 8-7 Plan covered 592 counties, which accounted for 
about 28% of all county-level administrative units in China. By 2000, the majority of 
the goals of the 8-7 Plan had been achieved. Rural net income per capita in National 
Poor Counties increased from 648 Yuan in 1993 to 1337 Yuan in 2000. Moreover, the 
population living below the poverty line kept on declining, from 80 million in 1993 to 
32 million in 2000.8 
 
2.5 The third wave (2001–2010):  
The huge success in poverty alleviation of the 8-7 Plan shrank the majority of the 
remaining population living in poverty down to 14 large areas, most of which were 
located in the western and central parts of China. Meanwhile, there remained a 
number of isolated villages distributed in other parts. In spite of the unprecedented 
achievement, the second wave was still criticized for its compromise with political 
interference that might have led to mis-selection of the National Poor Counties. 
Moreover, the program only targeted the absolutely poverty-stricken population, 
whose living conditions were lower than the international standard. In response to the 
previous criticisms and the existence of both centralized and decentralized rural poor, 
the central government launched another anti-poverty program in 2001, aiming to 
relieve the remaining poverty-stricken people and enhance infrastructure, education, 
and health conditions in the targeted regions.  
To improve the targeting accuracy, the Leading Group renewed the list and the 
poverty line again in 2001. The new standard was called the “631 index”, which took 
                                                              
8  Data sources: Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2000, Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2001, 
and Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2010. 
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the poverty population proportion in the country (weighted at 60%), rural net income 
per capita (weighted at 30%), and annual per capita GDP and annual per capita local 
government revenue (weighted at 10%) into consideration. The basic poverty line was 
1300 Yuan for rural net income per capita, 2700 Yuan for GDP per capita, and 120 
Yuan for average per capita revenue. However, the standard rose to 2700 Yuan for 
rural net income per capita for counties with large minority populations and old 
revolutionary base areas. According to the new standard, the Leading Group finally 
designated 592 National Poor Counties, from which all the counties in the eastern 
coastal provinces were eliminated. In addition, in 2007, the Chinese government 
adopted a higher standard to expand the coverage of the anti-poverty program in order 
to include not only the absolutely poverty-stricken population but also the low-income 
population. 
To support the whole program the Leading Group disbursed three main 
interventions, including the Food-for-Work program (yigong daizhen) supervised by 
the State Planning Commission, the budgetary grant program (fazhan zijin) overseen 
by the Ministry of Finance, and the subsidized loan program (tiexi daikuan) managed 
by the Agricultural Development Bank and the Poor Area Development Office 
(belonging to the Leading Group). Rather than merely financial supports, the central 
government proposed another three interventions, namely the Whole-Village 
Development (Zhengcun Tuijin), Labor Force Transfer Training (Laodongli Zhuanyi 
Peixun), and Agricultural Industrialization Poverty Alleviation (Nongye Chanyehua 
Fupin).  
First, recognizing the decentralization of population living in poverty, along with 
the new National Poor Counties, the Chinese government identified 148,000 poor 
villages, covering about 80% of the total rural poor. The Whole-Village Development 
was a community-based program. Each targeted village committee could decide its 
own development plan according to a democratic process with the full participation of 
its village members. Since the central government believed that the amelioration of 
living conditions and improvement of productivity would increase household income, 
the plan focused on the improvement of infrastructure and social welfare services. By 
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2009, about 108400 villages had started their Whole-Village Development plan. 
Among these villages, about 38400 were located in revolutionary based areas, 
minority autonomous areas, and inland regions. 
Second, the Labor Force Transfer Training program was a short-term job-training 
plan. The plan focused on training in work skills and agricultural techniques. After 
obtaining new skills in a short time, the higher quality rural labor force could be 
transferred to towns and cities to get job opportunities at higher wage levels. From 
2004 to 2009, the central government arranged 3 billion Yuan for the program. About 
400000 peasants participated in the training. Not surprisingly, 80% of these farmers 
accomplished the labor transfer program. A survey showed that a worker who was 
involved in the program usually had a 300 to 400 Yuan higher monthly salary than 
those who were not. 
Third, the Agricultural Industrialization Poverty Alleviation program emphasized 
the development of large corporations in the industrialized agricultural industry. By 
subsidizing those companies, the Chinese government expected that the flourishing of 
large corporations would promote the regional economy and in turn indirectly 
increase rural household income. The Agricultural Industrialization Poverty 
Alleviation program was market-oriented, aggregating local pillar industries or 
superior products to form a complete industry chain. In 2004, the Leading Group 
identified 260 large corporations based on the recommendations of each province. 
Since then, 8000 targeted villages had been included in the program. By 2009, the 
program had received 1.2 billion Yuan from revenue investment, and more than 4 
million households had lifted themselves out of poverty because of the program. 
The success of this wave was also astonishing. The rural net income reached 
5919 Yuan in 2010, about 1.6 times as much as it was in 2000. Table 2 depicts 
changes in the number of rural poverty-stricken people and the incidence of poverty 
from 2000 to 2010. Through the steadily increasing poverty line and the Leading 
Group’s adoption of a more extensive standard to identify the poor during the decade, 
the rural population living in poverty decreased by more than 60% from almost 50 
million in the National Poor Counties in 2002 to about 17 million in 2010. Moreover, 
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poverty incidence in the designated counties also decreased sharply after 2002, from 
24.3 percent to less than 10 percent in 2010.  
 
3. Data 
 
Our sample contains county-level data from the year 2000 to 20109, covering 
1,411 counties in the central and western regions of China. The majority of the data 
are obtained from China Data Online of the University of Michigan, which contains 
various important social and economic variables at county level, particularly GDP and 
local government revenue10 per capita that the Chinese government used for the 
National Poor Counties designation as well as other social welfare variables we are 
interested in. To establish a more comprehensive database, we have supplemented the 
current data source with a threefold effort. First, since most of the rural household net 
income data are missing in China Data Online, we have collected the data for 2000 to 
2010 in China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database supported by 
China Statistics Press. Second, to explore the relation between fiscal support and 
poverty alleviation, we have added some fiscal data from the Statistics on Public 
Finance of the Districts, Cities and Counties (Quanguo Di Shi Xian Caizheng Tongji 
Ziliao). Third, the lists of revolutionary base areas and minority autonomous areas are 
obtained from An Outline of Chinese Rural Economic Statistics by County 1988 
(Zhongguo Fenxian Nongcun Jingji Tongji Gaiyao 1988). Moreover, we referred to 
the CNKI database for the land frontier counties list with flat and mountainous 
counties lists. In addition, all the variables associated with money are measured in 
Yuan, taking the form of logarithm. They are as well deflated to the 2000 price level 
using price deflators calculated by annual CPI, which we also collected from the 
CNKI database. 
Considering the successively appearing statistical covariate selection methods, 
                                                              
9  To fulfill the common trend requirement, we include the information of six outcome variables in 1998 and 1999, 
namely two and three years before the implement of the National Poor Counties program. 
10  Local government revenue in China exclusively consists of various tax revenues. While transfer payments are 
included in the index named local government total revenue. 
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the causal relationships among potential outcomes, treatment assignment, and 
covariates should initially depend on theoretical bases and previously estimable 
analyses (Sianesi, 2004; Smith and Todd, 2005). Since the propensity score matching 
method only deals with the overt bias, to obtain a precise estimation of the propensity 
scores and avoid omitted variable bias, variables should not be excluded from our 
estimation unless the causal relationship fails both theoretically and statistically. In 
theory, only variables which can simultaneously affect the potential outcomes and 
treatment assignment should be included in our model. In practice, however, we face 
a trade-off between bias reduction and variance increment. Moreover, Cuong (2013) 
demonstrates with Monte Carlo simulations that when estimating the ATTs, more 
efficiency would be achieved if all the determinants of the outcome variable are 
included in the matching process. Therefore, besides the variables related to the 
potential outcomes and the treatment assignment, we also include determinants 
associated with the outcome variables. 
Based on the principles mentioned above, we categorize matching covariates into 
four categories. Since the program is implemented in 2001, all the matching 
covariates are lagged one year (in 2000) to avoid the contemporaneous endogeneity. 
The first category includes variables that would affect the potential outcomes and 
treatment assignment simultaneously. They are six variables announced explicitly by 
the Leading Group to construct the “631 index”, including pre-trend GDP per capita, 
rural households’ net income, local revenue per capita, and three dummy indicators of 
revolutionary based areas, minority autonomous areas, and land frontier counties. In 
this paper, the first three are also variables of interest. We use GDP per capita to 
measure the degree of economic growth. There is little doubt that economic growth 
contributes significantly to poverty alleviation (Ravallion and Datt, 2002; Ravallion 
and Chen, 2007), especially in China. As for rural households’ net income, it is the 
most direct assessment of a welfare program and has been widely used to evaluate the 
previous poverty alleviation waves (Park and Wang, 2010; Meng, 2013). Finally, to 
explore the revenue-generating ability of local governments, we measure the local 
revenue per capita. 
14 
 
The second category consists of another three variables of interest in pre-trend 
period. As mentioned in the plan of the program, the improvement of infrastructure 
was one of the main goals. Following Fan et al. (2004), we use the agricultural 
machinery power (AMP) per capita to measure the infrastructure condition. Moreover, 
Loayza and Raddatz (2010) argue that medical care would influence the capacity of 
poverty reduction programs. Thus, we employ the number of beds in hospitals and 
sanitation agencies owned by per million people to measure medical care. To support 
the newly emphasized social welfare aspects, the special transfer payments, which are 
allocated from higher governments to develop the targeted infrastructure, education 
and sanitary conditions, will be the main fund resource. 
The third category includes the rest covariates in 2000. We use the counties’ 
population density as the counties’ basic information. Local government expenditure 
per capita reflects the magnitude of the governments. Average educational years are 
chosen to measure the local educational conditions. At last, we exploit the share of 
first industry and the share of second industry to estimate the counties’ industrial 
structure.  
To meet the common trend assumption required by DID estimator, the last 
category involves outcome variables in 1999 and 1998 for each specific logit 
regression. We summarize the variables for year 2000 in Table 3. Before matching, a 
significant difference exists between the control group and the treated group, except 
for the dummy of the inland frontier areas. Table 3 shows that the designated counties 
are generally those with lower economic development and social welfare conditions. 
They are as well more agricultural prone counties. It suggests that one might attribute 
the effects due to the pretreatment imbalance to the National Poor Counties program. 
Therefore, we need a certain remedy to rebalance the data, rather than performing a 
simple comparison.  
 
4. Methodology 
Since the pretreatment data set is unbalanced, we have to find certain methods to 
remove the potential selection bias. In this paper, we utilize the propensity score 
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matching method to balance the two groups. Rather than arbitrarily using one 
matching method, we perform various methods and then compare their extent of bias 
reduction. 
 
4.1 Propensity score estimation 
Propensity score is a predicted probability of a unit to get treated, usually 
obtained from a logistic regression. Combined with matching methods, it enables us 
to transform multi-dimensional matching into one-dimensional matching, which 
increases the matching efficiency dramatically. We can also remove the overt bias 
with the propensity score matching process. Second, compared with regular linear 
regression methods, we do not need a valid instrumental variable and can make use of 
the logistic function as follows: 
1P( ) ( )
1 i ii i i i x
W X x E W
e 
                                       (1) 
where W୧ stands for the binary treatment status of observation i (W୧ = 1, if unit i is 
treated; W୧ = 0, otherwise), X୧ is a vector of conditional variables, and β୧ is the 
coefficient of X୧. 
In practice, we usually make the logarithmic transformation after the estimation. 
Since the logistic regression may underestimate the probability of rare events (Tomz 
et al., 2003), the rule of thumb is to choose a control group data set no more than nine 
times as large as the treatment group (Baser, 2006). In our sample, the control data set 
and treatment group ratio is about 2:1. Therefore, it is proper to apply logistic 
regression in our model. 
 
4.2 Matching algorithms 
In this part, we introduce the three most commonly used matching methods, from 
which our seven methods extend. The purpose of applying matching algorithms is to 
balance between the control group and the treated group. Due to the lack of randomly 
assigned treatments, the control units and the treated ones are usually unbalanced 
before the treatment. Hence, different outcomes may be attributed to those 
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pretreatment imbalances rather than the treatment effects. The matching algorithm 
with the highest quality is the one that can eliminate the difference between the 
treated and the control groups in the data set we analyzed.  
Let Iଵ and I଴ stand for sets of counties in the treated group and control group 
respectively, S୮ the region of common support, and then the ATT for the National 
Poor Counties program is defined as follows: 
1
0
1 0
1
1 ( , )
P
p
PSM
ATT i ii I S
j I S
Y W i j Y
n
  
                                      (2) 
where nଵ denotes the number of units in the set of I୧ ∩ S୮, and W(i, j) is the 
matching weights, which will be allocated to those control counties to further form a 
reliable counterfactual. Depending on the choice of the function form of W(i, j), a 
variety of matching methods have been proposed, that is nearest-neighbor matching, 
radius matching, and kernel matching. 
Nearest neighbor matching (NNM) compares the distance in terms of propensity 
score between non-participants and a participant, the closest one in the control group 
is chosen to be a matching partner for the treated individual (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). Radius matching (RM) is a method combining NNM with a caliper, which is a 
sort of tolerance level associated with the maximum distance in terms of propensity 
score. While, as a non-parametric matching algorithm, in kernel matching (KM), 
treated members are matched with a weighted average of a subgroup of control 
members depending on the bandwidth we choose. In addition, based on NNM, the 
first variant is called NNM without replacement, which means that individuals in the 
control group can be chosen as a matching partner no more than once. The second 
variation is n-to-1 NNM. The main difference between this variant and NNM is that 
we can use the closest n control individuals in distance as matching partners for a 
treated individual. 
To further eliminate unobservables that may affect the National Poor Counties’ 
assignment and the outcome variable, drawn on the panel data, we adopt the 
difference-in-difference matching strategy (Heckman et al., 1997; Gebel and Voßemer, 
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2014). Rather than directly focusing on the outcome variable, this variation matches 
on the before-and-after-treatment differences in the outcome between the treated and 
the matched controls. In this way, besides the overt bias, we are able to further 
eliminate the constant hidden differences and additive selection bias, and thereby 
significantly improve the quality of our estimation results. The 
difference-in-difference propensity score matching (PSM-DID) estimator is defined in 
the following way: 
1 0
1 1 ' 0 0 '
1
1 ( ) ( , )( )   
p p
DID PSM
ATT ti t i ti t i
i I S j I S
Y Y W i j Y Y
n
 
 
                           (3) 
where Yଵ୲୧ (Y଴୲୧) and Yଵ୲ᇱ୧ (Y଴୲ᇱ୧) are the outcome variables of interest for the treated 
(control) counties in time t and t’, that is before and after the implementation of the 
National Poor Counties program. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Propensity score estimation results 
In this paper, we have six variables of interest, each of which has distinct 
determinants. Consequently, we apply logistic regression six times separately for 
those outcome variables. As displayed in Table 4, most of the covariates included in 
the logistic regression are significant and exhibit reasonable signs as expected. 
Basically, no matter what outcome variables we choose, the GDP per capita, rural 
households’ net income, the local government expenditure, and sanitation conditions 
are negatively related to the probability of a county being chosen as a National Poor 
County. However, a county that is identified as a revolutionary based county and with 
a higher share of second industry and special transfer payment per capita is more 
likely to be selected as a National Poor County. Given six pseudo-R2 are all above 
0.500, our equations explain more than 50% of the variation in the choice.  
Moreover, to see the goodness of fit of our regression, we calculate the area 
under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The greater the predictive 
power of our estimation, the more bowed the ROC curve, hence the larger the area 
created under the curve. Therefore, the area under the curve (C-statistics) can be used 
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to measure the predictive power of our logistic regression. To achieve a valid 
classification, the C-statistic should be greater than 0.80, which is met in our case that 
is shown in Figure 2. 
 
5.2 Matching results 
Since bad quality matching with small bias reduction and therefore imbalance 
between the treated and the control groups could lead to biased estimation of the 
average treatment effect on the treated, to find out the most suitable type of matching, 
we implement five matching algorithms, including nearest neighbor matching, nearest 
neighbor matching without replacement, 3-to-1 nearest neighbor matching, radius 
matching, and kernel matching. Since a caliper can significantly improve the 
matching quality, according to the rule of thumb, we impose 0.25*SD (standard 
deviation) calipers on each matching algorithm. By doing so, we rely on the fact that 
the performance of different matching methods varies case by case mainly according 
to the data set we use. 
    As exhibited in Table 5, we test the group balance before and after matching 
based on three criteria.11 Firstly, we apply a t-test to calculate the t-statistics for the 
treated group and the control group after matching. Except for NNM without 
replacement, the other four algorithms perform equally badly, leaving around ten 
unbalanced variables between the participant and nonparticipant counties. As for the 
NNM without replacement, it induces no significant difference between two cohorts 
(all the p-values are greater than 0.100). 
Secondly, we check the standardized percentage bias, which is the percentage 
difference of the sample means in the treatment and matching subsamples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average of the variances in the treated and the 
control cohorts (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). Even without an explicit standard 
under which we can treat a standardized percentage bias as a success, 5%, 8% and 20% 
are commonly used as the sufficient threshold (Girma and Görg, 2007; Caliendo and 
                                                              
11  Because of the limited space, all the balancing test results reported in this subsection are based on the PSM 
method when the outcome variable is the ΔLog(GDP). When the outcome variable varies, the balancing tests 
share the similar results. 
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Kopeinig, 2008). It is clear that the performance of NNM without replacement is also 
the best under this criterion. Figure 3 depicts the standardized percentage bias across 
covariates after NNM without replacement. 
Lastly, we calculate the percentage bias reduction in the means of the 
independent variables after and before matching. The results are almost the same as 
those we obtain from the previous two criteria. As for the NNM without replacement, 
the percentage bias reductions of all the explanatory variables are more than 70.0% 
except for the land frontier, which are much higher than the results of other algorithms. 
Therefore, taking the three criteria into consideration, the best matching type for our 
data set is the NNM without replacement. In addition, we perform the sensitivity 
analysis by changing the caliper to more rigid ones, and the results vary little. Hence, 
we stick to NNM with 0.25*SD calipers for the following analysis. 
 
5.3 Impact of the third wave 
Although the National Poor Counties program was designed to promote 
economic growth and enrich the poor, the designated counties might well deviate 
from the original intention for their own interests. There were a couple of distinct 
potential responses of local governments to the beneficial program, leading to two 
opposite mechanisms by which the program functioned. Since economic growth 
would increase a local government’s revenue by expanding the tax base, a local 
government has an incentive to develop the economy, which in turn benefits itself. It 
turns out to be a virtuous circle. Meanwhile, economic growth is supposed to enrich 
the poor through trickle-down effects. In the case of China, the National Poor 
Counties exclusively received various transfer payments from both central and 
provincial governments and enjoyed preferential policies implemented by them; 
however, all these would be cancelled if a county became so developed that it passed 
the poverty line. Therefore, there existed two ways of development for local 
governments. First, taking advantage of the various benefits brought by the program, 
they could spare more effort on local development to pass the poverty line and 
continue their economic and welfare growth without the previous transfer payments 
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and preferential policies. Second, being afraid of losing the previous financial and 
political support and even slipping into retrogression, the designated counties might 
attempt to maintain their benefits from their National Poor County identities by 
lowering their growth rate to avoid passing the poverty line.  
Also, as mentioned in sections 2 and 3, the third wave was more ambitious than 
its predecessors in that besides regional economic growth and rural households’ 
income growth as the main goals of the first two waves, the explicit target of the third 
poverty alleviation wave consisted of three parts, namely infrastructure promotion, 
educational and sanitary conditions improvement. Since the first wave, the three main 
interventions had reflected that the promotion of infrastructure was ranked as the first 
priority in poverty alleviation attempts. Moreover, the third wave for the first time 
explicitly included the improvement of health and education as a poverty alleviation 
measure. However, whether these goals have been achieved remains unknown. 
Therefore, in this subsection, we attempt to answer two questions. First, what was the 
main local governments’ response to the program? Second, were those poverty 
alleviation goals achieved? 
 
5.3.1 What was the main response of local governments to the program? 
If the first mechanism functions, we would expect significantly positive 
coefficients for GDP and revenue in per capita form. However, if the second 
mechanism dominates, we would observe negative coefficients for GDP per capita at 
the end years of the program, which capture the attempts of local governments to limit 
their economic growth to maintain their identities in the next wave. We would as well 
expect significantly negative coefficients for revenue per capita, given the lower 
economic growth and consequently the shrunk tax base. In addition, since we assume 
that local governments are inclined to sacrifice GDP growth rate for higher transfer 
payments, some significantly positive coefficients for special transfer payment per 
capita are expected.  
As shown in the first column from Table 6 to Table 9, DID estimators reflect the 
ineffectiveness of the National Poor Counties program for the whole sample. GDP 
21 
 
growth rates in Table 6 are significantly negative at the beginning of the program, and 
turn to insignificant since 2004. The local government revenue in Table 8 almost 
follows the same pattern. Table 7 reveals that the income disparity between participant 
and nonparticipant counties is larger after the implementation of the program. We 
provide two possible explanations for the results. First, since local governments were 
inclined to limit their economic growth, the trickle-down effect that would benefit the 
poor as the economy boomed collapsed. Second, after China’s 20-year effort against 
poverty, the remaining poor residing in the most remote areas were still unable to 
share the benefits brought by national economic growth or the regional targeted 
poverty alleviation program. Thus, it was difficult to lift that part of the poor 
population out of poverty. In response to the bad economic performance, the central 
government allocates more transfer payments to support the designated counties since 
2006, as the estimates become positively significant in Table 9. 
From the estimation for the whole sample, we know little about the mechanism 
of the program except for the ineffectiveness. We therefore separate the sample to 
analyze the heterogeneity of subsamples, in order to identify which mechanism 
functions. We first identify the counties involved in the “Western Development 
Strategy” launched out in 2000 as the west counties; the rest as the non-west counties. 
The second column from Table 6 to Table 9 reveals a basically same pattern of the 
west counties as the whole sample. However, the special transfer payments received 
by west counties are insignificant in the sampled period. As for the non-west counties, 
the second mechanism functions. In the third column of Table 6, the GDP growth rate 
turns significantly negative since 2008 (-13.4% in 2008, -13.4% in 2009, and -17.9% 
in 2010), which means that for certain reasons the program hampered the economic 
growth of the non-west counties. It reflects that at the end of the third wave, the 
designated counties were worried about re-selection in the next wave and tried to limit 
their growth rate to maintain their identity in the following program. In addition, the 
coefficients of special transfer payment per capita are significantly positive in the 
most years, which reflect that the non-west counties are more likely to get access to 
the special transfer payments after the implementation of the program. The 
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aforementioned features demonstrate that the second mechanism was the main 
mechanism through which the National Poor Counties program affected local 
governments. 
We further analyze the heterogeneity for counties located in flat areas and 
mountainous areas. The fourth and fifth columns from Table 6 to Table 9 show the 
results. While the program has different effect on the two types of counties from the 
whole sample, we find almost no difference between the two types. In 2000s, the 
program generally has the negative effect on those counties in terms of GDP growth, 
income level, and local government revenue. Unfortunately, however, those counties 
do not obtain substantial transfer payments to compensate their lower economic 
development. 
 
5.3.2 Were those poverty alleviation goals achieved? 
Restricted by the limited data, in the paper, we are only able to detect the impact 
of program on the infrastructure conditions and sanitary conditions. In general, Table 
10 shows that the program has insignificant impact on the sanitary conditions at the 
beginning and end of 2000s, and significantly negative impact in the middle period. 
This is because after the special transfer payments increase since 2005, the negative 
effect on the sanitary conditions fades. The west counties and mountainous counties 
almost follow the same scenario with the whole sample. However, the program has no 
effect on the non-west counties in terms of sanitary conditions, for their all 
insignificant coefficients in the sample period. As for flat areas, there is a positive 
effect soon after the implementation of the National Poor Counties program (104.537, 
significant in 2001), though it lasts for only year. 
As mentioned in section 3, we exploit the agricultural machinery power per 
capita to investigate the rural infrastructure level. In the first column of Table 11, the 
insignificant coefficients of the whole sample reveal that the attempt of the program 
to improve infrastructure was in vain. Following the same decomposition method as 
before, we find that the results of the subsamples of west, non-west, and flat counties 
coincide with those of the whole sample. As for mountainous areas, the program 
23 
 
basically has no effect except for 2008, where the agricultural machinery power per 
capita decreases by 9.5%, which is significant at the 5% confidence level. Combining 
with results with respect to the special transfer payments in Table 9, we find that 
although the transfer payments increase for the whole sample and non-west counties 
in certain years, it fails to improve the infrastructure and sanitary conditions in 
designated counties. Thus, the social welfare goals of the program fail to be achieved. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
   
In this paper, we estimate the impact of the National Poor Counties program on 
those newly designated counties. To eliminate the overt bias to the largest extent, we 
compare five differentiated types of propensity score matching algorithms and find 
that the nearest neighbor matching (NNM) method is most suitable for our data set. 
We then combine NNM with the DID estimator to further control for the constant 
hidden differences and additive selection bias. We have two main findings. First, we 
distinguish two potential responses of local governments to the program. Based on 
our results, non-west local governments were inclined to limit their economic growth 
so as to maintain the special transfer payments disbursed exclusively to the designated 
counties. Second, we find that the targeted program had a negative effect on 
infrastructure in some years and failed to affect sanitary conditions in general. 
However, if we further decompose the whole sample into various types of counties, 
the National Poor Counties program would have different impacts on different 
subsamples. Our results show that the program was not totally in vain as it still 
worked in certain counties. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
The distribution of poverty population in 2000, 2005 and 2010 
 Year 2000 2005 2010 
Poverty 
Population 
Share With 
“Low-Income 
Standard” (%) 
    
All 10.2 6.8 2.8 
Eastern 2.9 1.6 0.4 
Central 8.8 6.6 2.5 
Western 20.6 13.3 6.1 
Source: Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2010 
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Table 2 
The rural poverty population and the incidence of poverty 
Year 
Poverty 
Line 
Income 
Level 
(Yuan) 
Rural Poverty Population 
(million) 
The Incidence of Poverty 
(%) 
Whole 
Country 
National 
Poor 
Counties 
Whole 
Country 
National 
Poor 
Counties 
2000 865 94.22 - 10.2 - 
2001 872 90.3 - 9.8 - 
2002 869 86.45 48.28 9.2 24.3 
2003 882 85.17 47.09 9.1 23.7 
2004 924 75.87 41.93 8.1 21 
2005 944 64.32 36.11 6.8 18 
2006 958 56.98 31.1 6 15.4 
2007 1067 43.2 26.2 4.6 13 
2008 1196 40.07 24.21 4.2 11.9 
2009 1196 35.97 21.75 3.8 10.7 
2010 1274 26.88 16.93 2.8 8.3 
Source: Poverty Monitoring Report of Rural China 2010 
 
  
28 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive table for treatment and control cohorts in 2000 
Variables 
Combined 
(N=1441) 
Control 
(N=892) 
Treatment 
(N=549) Difference 
Mean Mean Mean P-Value 
Log(GDP) 8.152 8.403 7.746 0.657*** 
Log(income) 7.433 7.638 7.101 0.536*** 
Log(revenue) 4.991 5.197 4.656 0.541*** 
revolutionary 0.198 0.164 0.253 -0.090*** 
minority 0.335 0.266 0.448 -0.182*** 
land 0.066 0.062 0.073 -0.011 
density 256.539 309.431 170.601 138.830*** 
Log(special) 4.057 3.856 4.383 -0.528*** 
Log(expenditure) 5.857 5.853 5.864 -0.011 
AMP 0.485 0.570 0.347 0.223*** 
beds 1880.772 2063.155 1584.443 478.712*** 
education 6.953 7.270 6.439 0.831*** 
first 36.404 33.428 41.239 -7.811*** 
second 32.597 35.567 27.772 7.794*** 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4 
Estimation of propensity score with logit 
Outcome variables 
 
ΔLog 
(GDP) 
ΔLog 
(income) 
ΔLog 
(revenue) 
ΔLog 
(special) Δbeds ΔAMP 
Log(GDP) -1.658*** -2.367*** -2.669*** -2.151*** -2.448*** -2.861*** 
(0.540) (0.436) (0.423) (0.404) (0.383) (0.412) 
Log(revenue) -0.101 -0.031 0.314 0.170 0.225 -0.079 
(0.333) (0.338) (0.477) (0.322) (0.317) (0.325) 
Log(income) -2.932*** -1.782*** -2.904*** -3.072*** -3.164*** -2.842*** 
(0.392) (0.474) (0.386) (0.392) (0.373) (0.375) 
revolutionary 1.007*** 1.133*** 1.031*** 0.879*** 1.014*** 1.118*** 
(0.251) (0.255) (0.250) (0.256) (0.245) (0.245) 
minority 0.081 0.176 0.206 0.548 0.186 0.154 
(0.340) (0.340) (0.335) (0.347) (0.332) (0.325) 
land 0.463 0.305 0.335 0.601 0.268 0.290 
(0.434) (0.438) (0.431) (0.435) (0.415) (0.419) 
density -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.001* -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log(special) 1.740*** 1.706*** 1.786*** 1.331*** 1.666*** 1.809*** 
(0.271) (0.272) (0.269) (0.272) (0.263) (0.269) 
Log(expenditu
re) -1.188** -1.314** -1.163** -0.677 -1.262** -1.810*** 
(0.519) (0.523) (0.519) (0.505) (0.512) (0.501) 
AMP -0.633 -0.639 -0.627 -0.966** -0.717 
(0.398) (0.405) (0.399) (0.411) (0.447) 
beds -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
education -0.133 -0.008 -0.112 -0.042 -0.067 -0.182 
(0.165) (0.171) (0.164) (0.164) (0.155) (0.158) 
first -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 0.002 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
second 0.029** 0.025* 0.029** 0.038*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
outcome1999 0.654 -0.263 0.327 0.817** -0.000 -0.023 
(0.752) (0.671) (0.607) (0.317) (0.000) (0.094) 
outcome1998 -2.009*** -2.235*** -0.992** 1.060*** -0.000 0.143 
(0.704) (0.605) (0.479) (0.269) (0.000) (0.241) 
N 1441 1441 1441 1441 1441 1441 
Pseudo-R2 0.545 0.552 0.540 0.566 0.529 0.527 
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Table 5 
Balancing comparison ( Outcome variable is ΔLog(GDP)) 
Variables NNM with replacement 
NNM 
without 
replacement 
3-to-1 NNM RM KM 
Criterion 1: T-test P-values 
Log(GDP) 0.000 0.171 0.000 0.000 0.065 
Log(income) 0.001 0.763 0.000 0.008 0.025 
Log(revenue) 0.005 0.250 0.068 0.020 0.296 
revolutionary 0.010 0.793 0.028 0.114 0.868 
minority 0.117 0.812 0.489 0.335 0.619 
land 0.184 0.693 0.200 0.315 0.654 
density 0.196 0.342 0.589 0.202 0.263 
Log(special) 0.344 0.332 0.003 0.002 0.172 
Log(expenditure) 0.177 0.963 0.000 0.000 0.026 
AMP 0.320 0.749 0.327 0.039 0.554 
beds 0.005 0.741 0.001 0.001 0.010 
education 0.156 0.498 0.001 0.023 0.029 
first 0.000 0.332 0.005 0.048 0.042 
second 0.000 0.300 0.004 0.042 0.062 
Log(GDP1999) 0.000 0.297 0.000 0.004 0.066 
Log(GDP1998) 0.000 0.393 0.000 0.000 0.030 
Criterion 2: The percentage bias 
Log(GDP) -22.6 13.5 -21.3 -19.7 -10.9 
Log(income) 26.4 3.7 29.8 20.5 18.6 
Log(revenue) -16.9 11.9 -11.2 -14.4 -6.8 
revolutionary 16.1 -3.2 13.9 10.1 -1.3 
minority 10.1 -2.7 -4.5 -6.3 3.7 
land 7.6 5.1 7.4 5.9 2.8 
density -6.2 10.5 2.6 6.0 -6.9 
Log(special) -6.5 -12.5 -21.1 -21.0 -11.0 
Log(expenditure) -8.9 -0.6 -24.8 -25.9 -16.9 
AMP -4.1 3.2 -4.1 -9.0 -3.0 
beds -13.6 3.4 -17.2 -15.9 -15.6 
education 12.4 8.3 30.2 20.7 19.5 
first 24.8 -10.9 16.7 11.7 14.6 
second -25.1 11.8 -16.3 -11.8 -13.2 
Log(GDP1999) -23.6 10.4 -19.6 -16.3 -11.3 
Log(GDP1998) -29.6 8.8 -25.0 -20.2 -13.6 
Criterion 3: Percentage bias reduction 
Log(GDP) 83.1 90.4 84.9 86.0 92.3 
Log(income) 83.7 97.7 81.6 87.3 88.5 
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Log(revenue) 82.2 87.5 88.2 84.9 92.8 
revolutionary 27.5 85.8 37.5 54.3 94.3 
minority 73.8 93.0 88.3 83.7 90.5 
land -70.4 -13.7 -64.7 -31.3 37.3 
density 89.5 82.3 95.7 89.8 88.4 
Log(special) 90.2 81.2 68.3 68.4 83.5 
Log(expenditure) -321.9 72.2 -1074.1 -1126.4 -700.9 
AMP 93.0 94.6 93.0 84.7 94.8 
beds 71.3 92.9 63.8 66.4 67.1 
education 85.4 90.3 64.5 75.7 77.0 
first 57.3 81.1 71.2 79.8 74.9 
second 58.1 80.4 72.8 80.3 77.9 
Log(GDP1999) 82.6 92.4 85.6 88.0 91.7 
Log(GDP1998) 78.1 93.5 81.5 85.1 90.0 
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Table 6 
The impact of the National Poor Counties on GDP growth 
Δlog(GDP) All West Non-west Mountain Flat 
2001 -0.022** -0.017 -0.022 -0.040*** -0.025 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.022) (0.014) (0.021) 
2002 -0.040*** -0.041** -0.024 -0.058*** -0.059** 
(0.014) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) 
2003 -0.039* -0.006 -0.037 -0.063* -0.097* 
(0.021) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.053) 
2004 -0.043 -0.051 -0.046 -0.109** -0.089* 
(0.027) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.051) 
2005 -0.047 -0.073 -0.068 -0.124** -0.107 
(0.034) (0.045) (0.052) (0.053) (0.066) 
2006 -0.050 -0.065 -0.090 -0.140** -0.151* 
(0.038) (0.050) (0.057) (0.060) (0.081) 
2007 -0.057 -0.091 -0.092 -0.161** -0.166* 
(0.042) (0.059) (0.058) (0.066) (0.090) 
2008 -0.067 -0.070 -0.134** -0.160** -0.209* 
(0.048) (0.066) (0.059) (0.071) (0.108) 
2009 -0.068 -0.092 -0.134** -0.154** -0.188* 
(0.048) (0.070) (0.061) (0.071) (0.105) 
2010 -0.073 -0.079 -0.179*** -0.160** -0.199* 
  (0.050) (0.071) (0.064) (0.071) (0.111) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
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Table 7 
The impact of the National Poor Counties on income growth 
Δlog(income) All West Non-west Mountain Flat 
2001 -0.082*** -0.064** -0.055 -0.072** -0.007 
(0.025) (0.030) (0.046) (0.034) (0.068) 
2002 -0.090*** -0.062** -0.081 -0.081** -0.044 
(0.027) (0.031) (0.051) (0.040) (0.064) 
2003 -0.110*** -0.030 -0.134** -0.097** -0.073 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.057) (0.042) (0.079) 
2004 -0.135*** -0.053 -0.138** -0.087* -0.103 
(0.031)  (0.034) (0.054) (0.045) (0.073) 
2005 -0.166*** -0.078** -0.205*** -0.116** -0.157* 
(0.033)  (0.036) (0.064) (0.047) (0.081) 
2006 -0.183***  -0.083** -0.248*** -0.119** -0.192** 
(0.033)  (0.038) (0.061) (0.048) (0.076) 
2007 -0.164  0.009 -0.253*** -0.017 -0.234*** 
(0.112)  (0.182) (0.064) (0.202) (0.072) 
2008 -0.177***  -0.102** -0.251*** -0.116** -0.183** 
(0.038)  (0.043) (0.070) (0.051) (0.084) 
2009 -0.179***  -0.117*** -0.232*** -0.119** -0.265*** 
(0.038)  (0.044) (0.067) (0.052) (0.084) 
2010 -0.203***  -0.122*** -0.253*** -0.116** -0.284*** 
  (0.041)  (0.045) (0.074) (0.055) (0.089) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
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Table 8 
The impact of the National Poor Counties on local government revenue growth 
Δlog(revenue) All West Non-west Mountain Flat 
2001 -0.054**  -0.059* -0.037 -0.027 -0.077 
(0.022)  (0.031) (0.029) (0.036) (0.049) 
2002 -0.038  -0.056 -0.068* 0.003 -0.126* 
(0.027)  (0.037) (0.041) (0.045) (0.073) 
2003 -0.050  -0.015 -0.109** 0.034 -0.183* 
(0.034)  (0.041) (0.052) (0.048) (0.099) 
2004 -0.071  -0.003 -0.213*** -0.055 -0.206 
(0.049)  (0.060) (0.068) (0.064) (0.140) 
2005 -0.090  -0.017 -0.268*** -0.089 -0.296* 
(0.064)  (0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.175) 
2006 -0.069  0.060 -0.311*** -0.074 -0.287 
(0.075)  (0.103) (0.100) (0.102) (0.192) 
2007 -0.094  0.013 -0.309*** -0.148 -0.272 
(0.075)  (0.104) (0.100) (0.106) (0.194) 
2008 -0.081  0.048 -0.302*** -0.134 -0.279 
(0.077)  (0.106) (0.101) (0.114) (0.207) 
2009 -0.061  0.050 -0.248** -0.157 -0.172 
(0.076)  (0.105) (0.099) (0.113) (0.196) 
2010 -0.035  0.112 -0.229** -0.153 -0.191 
  (0.076)  (0.108) (0.101) (0.117) (0.204) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
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Table 9 
The impact of the National Poor Counties on special transfer payments 
Δlog(special) All West Non-west Mountain Flat 
2001 0.156 -0.622 0.328** -0.353 -0.714 
(0.322) (0.520) (0.148) (0.499) (1.001) 
2002 0.178 -0.548 0.310** -0.342 -0.520 
(0.313) (0.501) (0.148) (0.495) (0.966) 
2003 0.182 -0.486 0.232 -0.336 -0.683 
(0.308) (0.496) (0.142) (0.487) (0.955) 
2004 0.170 -0.529 0.293* -0.306 -0.550 
(0.317) (0.506) (0.154) (0.500) (0.995) 
2005 0.172 -0.489 0.332** -0.311 -0.502 
(0.316) (0.502) (0.142) (0.499) (0.988) 
2006 0.067 -0.022 0.104* 0.037 0.053 
(0.057) (0.077) (0.062) (0.073) (0.147) 
2007 0.115* -0.003 0.101 0.006 0.105 
(0.059) (0.083) (0.076) (0.069) (0.129) 
2008 0.111* 0.034 0.062 0.070 0.061 
(0.066) (0.102) (0.072) (0.099) (0.125) 
2009 0.145** 0.067 0.121* 0.095 0.174 
(0.065) (0.101) (0.071) (0.102) (0.123) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
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Table 10 
The impact of the National Poor Counties on sanitary conditions 
Δbeds All West Non-west Mountain Flat 
2001 32.760 19.351 95.493 6.506 104.537* 
(61.302) (94.632) (58.683) (96.522) (58.245) 
2002 -97.631* -108.005 -28.597 -141.834 -37.544 
(57.513) (93.748) (70.557) (100.158) (99.627) 
2003 -96.508 -157.799 4.671 -149.775 -1.549 
(63.539) (101.428) (78.580) (111.954) (105.363) 
2004 -48.427 80.143 -11.111 57.456 -228.461 
(100.371) (173.361) (80.316) (191.723) (173.881) 
2005 -221.573*** -195.712* -0.056 -272.632** -118.135 
(64.907) (106.546) (80.078) (111.355) (184.418) 
2006 -215.116*** -167.429 8.652 -346.602** -120.604 
(79.023) (128.923) (96.165) (135.893) (205.085) 
2007 -257.892*** -312.690** 8.743 -452.620*** -169.256 
(85.900) (137.376) (90.670) (150.648) (198.815) 
2008 -31.028 -91.375 104.983 -217.273 109.191 
(78.824) (120.948) (107.253) (137.516) (147.481) 
2009 16.327 -13.267 50.651 -245.055* 16.459 
(88.677) (132.591) (107.253) (141.006) (194.845) 
2010 -18.913 -35.633 -59.864 -225.896 178.465 
  (95.764) (136.258) (113.728) (153.169) (214.334) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
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Table 11 
The impact of the National Poor Counties on infrastructure conditions 
ΔAMP All West Non-west Mountain Flat 
2001 0.008 -0.001 -0.005 -0.012 0.023 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) 
2002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 0.036 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.029) 
2003 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.019 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.037) 
2004 0.017 0.026 0.009 0.002 0.011 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.043) 
2005 0.008 0.006 -0.007 -0.023 0.004 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.050) 
2006 0.006 -0.009 0.017 -0.029 -0.001 
(0.029) (0.036) (0.045) (0.038) (0.065) 
2007 0.015 -0.016 -0.030 -0.016 -0.014 
(0.029) (0.039) (0.038) (0.046) (0.061) 
2008 -0.017 -0.018 -0.032 -0.095** 0.050 
(0.029) (0.041) (0.043) (0.039) (0.068) 
2009 -0.002 -0.031 -0.009 -0.065 0.014 
(0.036) (0.053) (0.049) (0.043) (0.085) 
2010 0.029 0.029 -0.045 -0.016 0.014 
  (0.053) (0.086) (0.054) (0.090) (0.095) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 
The distribution of National Poor Counties 
 
 
Prior wave: 1978–198512                  First wave: 1986–1993 
 
Second wave: 1994–2000                Third wave: 2001–2010 
  
                                                              
12  Since the National Poor Counties program was not yet established in this wave, we use “the poor counties list 
1977–1979” instead. 
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Figure 2 
Receiver operating characteristic curve and C-statistics13 
  
                (a)                                (b) 
  
                (c)                                (d) 
  
                (e)                                (f) 
 
  
                                                              
13  From (a) to (f), the outcome variables are ΔLog(GDP), ΔLog(income), ΔLog(revenue), ΔLog(special), Δbeds and 
ΔAMP in order. 
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Figure 3 
Standardized percentage bias across covariates (a) 
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